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" ... word and language form the medium that sustains the common existence 
of the human spirit as such. The reality of the word in eminent ways makes 
existential interaction happen. And so, if the word becomes corrupted, human 
existence itself will not remain unaffected and untainted.'" 
A man is struck and killed by a car as he crosses the street. Was it murder or an 
accident? What information would you need to make such a distinction? A 
crucial bit of information is the intent of the driver. Suppose that in one case the 
driver had been waiting for the man to enter the street, fully intending to run him 
down; in the other case an elderly man having difficulty adjusting to the sun's 
glare did not see the victim until it was too late. Both cases would look identical if 
captured on film. Is the moral culpability of the driver identical in both cases? 
Does the intent of the physician affect the morality of an end of life decision? 
Does it make a difference whether the intent of the physician is to relieve pain and 
suffering or cause the patient's death? This and other controversial points 
including the voluntariness of the act by the patient, and the method used 
-commission vs. omission - are key elements in understanding euthanasia.2,3,4,s 
This paper examines the differing interpretations of the recently released 
"Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia," [the 
Remmelink Report6]. The interpretations differ primarily in their assessment of 
the intent of the physician in end-of-life decisions. One interpretation affirms the 
moral impact of the intent of the physician while the other interpretation I 
discounts "intent" as being morally irrelevant. Unfortunately, the widely quoted .. 
interpretation of the popular press and medical journals is that which ignores 
physician intent in defining euthanasia. 
We argue that denying the moral impact of the intent of the physician in 
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end-of-life decisions blurs the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing or 
withholding care. The consequences of failing to make this important distinction 
are discussed. 
The Remmelink Report 
Background 
Euthanasia, although technically illegal, has been permitted in the Netherlands 
for over two decades. There have been many criticisms of this practice from both 
inside and outside the Netherlands. A major concern has been the lack of reliable 
data describing what euthanasia practices Dutch physicians are actually 
performing. These factors resulted in the formation of a commission to study 
euthanasia in the Netherlands. The report of this commission, generally referred 
to as the Remmelink Report, was released on September 10, 1991.6 
The study consisted of three sections. The first involved detailed interviews 
with 405 physicians concerning their previous use of euthanasia and related 
end-of-life Questions; the second section was a retrospective chart review of 7000 
deaths; in the third section, these same 405 physicians were prospectively 
followed for 6 months and interviewed about every death in their practice. All 
three sections yielded similar resultsN The definitions used in the study are listed 
in Table 1. 
The study distinguished three types of intention by the physician: 1) the 
definite aim being to shorten the patient's life, 2) shortening the patient's life being 
one of the doctor's intentions, and 3) accepting the side-effect of shortening the 
patient's life.6,7 
Interpretation 
There have been two distinct interpretations of the Remmelink study, one 
authored principally by Fenigsen (Table 2)8,9 and other by van der Maas (Table 
3)7. At first glance, one would have difficulty understanding how Tables 2 and 3 
were compiled from the same data. Let us examine and account for the disparities 
(summarized in Table 4). 
Two key elements in the definition of euthanasia (Table 1) underlie the 
different conclusions: 
1) Fenigsen interprets "intentional" as involving either a primary (definite) 
aim or a secondary (partial) aim of the physician. Van der Maas does not 
incorporate the concept of physician intent into the category of euthanasia. 
2) Fenigsen interprets "action to terminate life" as any commission (direct) or 
omission (indirect) on the part of the physician in which the intent is to shorten 
life. Van der Maas allows only acts of commission, thus eliminating non-
treatment decisions from the category of euthanasia: 
To illustrate, in the case of direct euthanasia: 
1. The Remmelink Report tells us that 22,500 patients died of an overdose 
of morphine sulfate. 
2. In 36% of these cases the intent of the physician was to shorten life. 
(Remmelink Table 7.2) Fenigsen classifies these deaths as euthanasia. 
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3. Thus, 8,100 (22,500 X 0.36) patients directly euthanized by morphine 
sulfate overdose. 
4. Of these, 39% were voluntary and 61 % involuntary. 
(Remmelink Table 7.7) 
5. Therefore, there were 3159 (8,100 X 0.39) cases of direct voluntary 
euthansia and 4941 (8,100 X 0.61) cases of direct involuntary euthanasia. 
In Table 4 we see that Fenigsen has summed up all direct voluntary euthanasia 
cases in which physicians intentionally and directly shortened a patient's life. This 
includes the 2,300 that van der Maas reports as "euthanasia" plus an additional 
400 that van der Maas reports as "assisted suicide," plus the 3159 calculated 
above as "direct voluntary" cases of morphine overdose categorized by van der 
Maas as "alleviation of pain and symptoms" (APS). 
The same calculations hold for the involuntary direct column: 1000 that van 
der Maas reports as "involuntary" plus 4,941 direct involuntary deaths as 
calculated above. 
V sing similar data a vailable in the Remmelink Report for indirect euthanasia, 
one can calculate that there were 13,506 cases of withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment with the intent of shortening the patient's life. Of these, 4,756 occurred 
with the patient's consent and 8,750 were without the patient's consent.6,7,8 Van 
der Maas categorizes all of these as non-treatment decisions (NTD), rather than 
euthanasia. (See Table 4) 
Discussion 
These widely disparate interpretations of the same data result from failure to 
agree on the definition of euthanasia. Hence, van der Maas can conclude that 
euthanasia is responsible for 1.8% of all deaths in the Netherlands while Fenigsen, 
working with the same data, puts the rate at 19.4%. 
Fenigsen and van der Maas' fundamental diagreement concerns the intent of 
the physician in end oflife decisions. Fenigsen acknowledges the moral impact 
that results when the intent of the physician is to shorten the life of the patient and 
defines deaths from such intent as "euthanasia." In contast, van der Maas ignores 
the physician'S intent and categorizes these deaths under "alleviation of pain and 
symptoms" or "non-treatment decisions." Thus, when Fenigsen defines 
euthanasia as the intent to shorten a patient's life, a significant increase in deaths 
categorized as euthanasia (19.4%) is observed. Reclassifying these deaths as 
"alleviation of pain and symptoms" (APS) or "non-treatment decisions" (NTD), 
and ignoring the intent of the physician, as van der Maas does, substantially 
reduces the number of euthanasia deaths (1.8%). 
The World Medical Association1o, Dutch 4,11 and American2 experts 
commonly use the word "deliberate" to describe the physician's intent in 
euthanasia. The term "deliberate" implies a specific moral significance - a 
planned and willful act. 
The intent of the moral agent is recognized as paramount in long-standing 
common law tradition. The American Bar Association Commission on Legal 
Problems of the Elderly, in a recent statement concerning aid-in-dying 
legislation, unanimously agreed that such legislation " . . . eliminates a long-
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standing, just and clear demarcation in criminal law based upon intent to kill. 
Without it, we risk the classic 'slippery slope' to state-sanctioned death."12 State 
laws concerning murder and manslaughter distinguish different degrees of guilt 
or innocence based largely on intent. 13 In daily life we routinely acknowledge the 
moral impact of the intent of the moral agent - "Pardon me, I didn't mean to 
bump into you." And all would agree that the first driver in our opening scenario 
is guilty of first-degree murder, while the second driver, who did not intend to 
hurt anyone, is the victim of a tragic accident. Thus, to ignore the importance of 
intent in defining euthanasia is to deny a key aspect of the definition of 
euthanasia, a basic legal tenent, and common sense. 
It is commonly accepted that there is no moral difference between 
withdrawing therapy already started and withholding therapy never begun, 14 
chiefly because the intent of the physician is not to shorten the life of the patient 
but to relieve the patient of the burdens of therapy. Arkes et. al. summarize: 
Medical treatments can be refused or withheld if they are either useless or excessively 
burdensome. No one should be subjected to useless treatment; no one need accept any 
and all lifesaving treatments, no matter how burdensome. In making such decisions, the 
judgement is about the worth of treatments, not about the worth of lives. When we ask 
whether a treatment is useless, the question is: "Will this treatment be useful for this 
patient, will it benefit the life he or she has?" When we ask whether a treatment is 
burdensome, the question is: "Is this treatment excessively burdensome to the life ofthis 
patient?,' The question is not whether this life is useless or burdensome . .. We can and 
should allow the dying to die; we must never intend the death of the living. We may 
reject a treatment; we must never reject a life. IS 
Thus, the discontinuation of a ventilator may be euthanasia (the intent being the 
death of the patient) or the withdrawal of therapy (the intent being to remove 
burdensome therapy). To an observer, the two scenes would appear identical, yet 
they would be morally distinct, since in the first situation a person has been killed, 
while in the second a person has been allowed to die. Thus, the failure to consider 
physician intent in defining euthanasia vs. withdrawal-withholding of treatment 
has obscured the very real ethical and legal implications of such acts. 
Conclusions 
I. The Remmelink Report has been interpreted and reported in ways which obscure 
its true implications. Fenigsen defines all cases in which the primary intent of the 
physician was to cause death as "euthanasia", while the popularly quoted van der 
Maas denies physician intent by categorizing the same deaths as "alleviation of pain 
and symptoms" or "non-treatment decisions." A full English translation of the 
Remmelink Report is not yet available. Meanwhile, the official interpretation (that of 
van der Maas) is being published in the popular press and medical journals, barely 
mentioning the details of the study.16 As a result, the Remmelink Report - the most 
significant and extensive compilation of data on euthanasia practices available - has 
been largely misinterpreted. One purpose of this paper is to encourage frank and 
open discussion of this study. 
2. Ignoring the moral impact of physician intent blurs the distinction between 
euthanasia and withdrawing or withholding care. At a time when practicing 
physicians ma;t need the support of dear bioethical thinking, tim thinking is being muddled. 
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A recent survey by the American Society of Internal Medicine asked 402 
internists "Have you ever taken a deliberate action that would directly cause a 
patient's death?" Eighty physicians (20%) said "Yes",11 Are we to believe that 
20% of internists have performed direct euthanasia, an act that is illegal 
throughout the U.S.? We suggest that the vast majority of these "deliberate 
actions" were instances of withdrawing or withholding care and that the 
responding physicians were not considering the intent of their actions. Similarly, 
Wilson et al in a study of the use of sedatives and analgesics in patients from 
whom life support was being withdrawn or withheld found that physicians 
ordered drugs "to hasten death" in 39% of patients. IS The authors were troubled 
;' enough by this finding to go back and talk to those involved and subsequently 
concluded that caregivers had been "guided by the ethical principle of double 
effect." They had foreseen the hastening of death as an unavoidable side effect of 
the use of sedatives and analgesics, but had not intended to hasten death. 
There are cases in which it is almost impossible to separate the motivations 
underlying physician action or incation. As human beings our motives are 
frequently mixed. These cases should not cause us to deny that our intentions ever 
make a difference. Rather, we need to study and clarify our decision making 
process. 
3. Acronyms depersonalize and further blur our ability to make distinctions. The 
introduction of the terms "MDEL", "APS", and "NTD" serve more to confuse 
than to clarify. Their definitions are so broad and vague that a wide variety of 
disparate actions could be described in anyone of them. They are at best a 
misguided attempt to simplify bioethical discourse and at worst a subterfuge. 
4. Blurring the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing or withholding 
care diverts attention from the real issues of caring for the patient. Euthanasia is 
easier, quicker and cheaper than hospice care, which is recognized world-wide as 
a standard of care for dying patients. However, hospice care does not include 
using doses of narcotics that will intentionally shorten the patient's life. A 
superficial inspection would lead one to believe that "alleviation of pain and 
symptoms" fits in with the concept of hospice. Yet we have seen that a significant 
number of patients in the "allevation of pain and symptoms" category were given 
narcotics with the intention of shortening their lives, often without their consent 
5. Blurring the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing or withholding 
care subverts the patient's trust in the medical profession. We as physicians may 
not distinguish our intent (see #2 above) or we may hide behind acronyms (see #3 
above) but our patients will know what we are doing. There is anecdotal 
evidence of widespread fear of hospitals and doctors among Dutch elderly and 
reports of patients going to neighboring countries for their health care. Some aged 
patients in the Netherlands have formed "Sanctuary", an anti-euthanasiagroup.19 
Despite reassurances, the Dutch elderly know what their doctors are doing. They 
are supported in their fears by the finding of the Remmelink Commission that 
58% of euthanasia deaths are involuntary. (see Table 2) 
6. Blurring the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing or withholding 
care undermines the value of human life. Physicians need no longer concern 
themselves with whether or not they are committing euthanasia if they are 
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"APSing" or "NTDing" the patient. The definitions of the various degrees of 
murder and manslaughter are based in large part on the intention of the moral 
agent. Denying these distinctions would effectively allow an end-run around the 
definition of murder. 
7. Blurring the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing or withholding 
care "greases the slippery slope" toward ever more liberal use of means to shorten 
patient's lives. Singer and Siegler distinguish four ways in which a policy of 
voluntary euthanasia could lead to involuntary euthanasia.2 Crypthanasia (secret 
euthanasia) is well documented in the Remmelink Report, both as involuntary 
euthanasia previously mentioned, and in other data showing that the majority of 
physicians performing voluntary euthanasia do not document this fact, 
frequently falsifying death certificates.6,8 Encouraged euthanasia (patients 
pressured to choose euthanasia) has been documented by HilhorsPo Surrogate -
euthanasia (a euthanasia decision made by someone other than the patient or 
doctor) is documented in the Remmelink report.6,7,8 Discriminatory euthanasia, 
albeit in small numbers and difficult to document, occurs in some cases of 
newborns with disabilities, psychiatric patients, and others. 7,8 
8. Blurring the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing or withholding 
care is a corruption oflanguage and as such will affect and taint human existence 
itself. Pieper's warning that heralded this paper is being played out in the care of 
the elderly and terminally ill today. Clarifying the language we use to talk about 
decisions made in the dying process is one of the first steps we must take to return 
to the roots of our profession - to cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort 
always. 
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Table 1 
REMMELINK REPORT 
Definitions 
Euthanasia • the intentional action to terminate life, performed by 
someone other than the involved person, upon the 
latter's request 
MDEL • major decisions concerning the end of life 
NTD 
APS 
• the prescription, supply or administration of drugs with 
the explicit intention of shortening life, to include 
euthanasia at the patient's request, assisted suicide, and 
life-terminating acts without explicit and persistent 
request 
• non-treatment decisions 
• the withholding or withdrawal of treatment in 
situations where the treatment would probably have 
prolonged life 
• alleviation of pain and symptoms 
• the use of opioids in such doses that the patient's life 
might have been shortened 
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Table 2 
REMMELINK REPORT 
Fenigsen Interpretation 
Direct Euthanasia Indirect Euthanasia 
# of deaths (% of all deaths) # of deaths (% of all deaths) 
Voluntary 5859 (4.5%) 4756 (3.7%) 
Involuntary 5941 (4.6%) 8750 (6.7%) 
Total Euthanasia Deaths: 25,306 or 19.4% of all deaths 
Fenigsen, Issues Law Med., 1991 
Table 3 
REMMELINK REPORT 
van der Maas Interpretation 
# of deaths (% of all deaths) 
Euthanasia 
Assisted Suicide 
Involuntary 
Alleviation of pain and symptoms (APS) 
Non-treatment decision (NTD) 
van der Maas, Lancet, 1991 
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2300 (1.8%) 
400 (0.3%) 
1000 (0.8%) 
22,750 (17.5%) 
22,750 (17.5%) 
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Table 4 
REMMELINK REPORT 
Reconciliation of Interpretations 
Direct Euthanasia 
# of deaths 
Indirect Euthanasia 
# of deaths 
Voluntary 2300 (van der Maas 1.8% Euthanasia) 4756 (Fenigsen) 
Involuntary 
400 (van der Maas 0.3% Assisted Suicide) 
3159 (van der Maas·) 
5859 (Fenigsen) 
1000 (van der Maas 0.8% Involuntary) 
4941 (van der Maas·) 
5941 (Fenigsen) 
(van der Maast) 
8750 (Fenigsen) 
(van der Maas t) 
• van der Maas uAPS" from Remmelink Vol. II pg. 58, table 7.2; pg 61 table 7.7; intent to shorten life. 
t van der Maas uNTD" from Remmelink Vol. I pg 15; Vol II, pp 64,66; intent to shorten life. 
t van der Maas UNTO" from Remmelink Vol. II pg 72; intent to shorten life. 
Fenigsen, Issues Law Med., 1991 
van der Maas, Lance~ 1991 
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